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Original Article
Coronavirus as a Ghost Writer of 
Envoi (Li Lu)
The apparition of these faces in the crowd.
—Ezra Pound, “In a Station of the Metro”
The French word envoi is polysemic, defined as dispatch, 
the action of sending, something that is sent, a poetic dedi-
cation or dedication of a literary work, and the marking of 
the beginning of a process. This article is a dispatch from 
Hubei, China, based on the author’s 4-month stay in his 
hometown Qianjiang, a small city in the middle of Hubei, 
during the Coronavirus pandemic. Firsthand observations 
sent from the epicenter give us a clear picture of what the 
coronavirus has done. Moreover, this article argues that 
the coronavirus marks a spectral moment in which a 
repressed trauma returns. There have been fierce debates 
on the origins of the coronavirus and the political, eco-
nomic, and social significances of the pandemic. Popular 
representations of the coronavirus which isolate, stigma-
tize, and terrify the Other are symptoms of a returning 
trauma, which is caused by bodily memories of being vic-
tims in past disasters. A Derridean reading of the envoi 
highlights the inherent failure of sending: What is sent can 
always be held up by a malfunctioning in the process of 
the sending or postal system, and the meaning of the 
trauma is lost. This traumatic failure results in a repetition 
in representation and the return of what is sent to the 
writer/sender. Proposing a supplement, this article fore-
grounds bodily knowledge acquired through social and 
political trauma by virtue of fear of the coronavirus. This 
fear of what is familiar reminds us of the feeling of the 
uncanny. According to Freud and Derrida, the uncanny is 
related to the spectral working of a hidden desire that 
repeatedly returns as a haunting body, representation, and 
history. This line of thinking helps us to better understand 
conflicting representations of the coronavirus.
The coronavirus is a ghost. This is not merely a meta-
phorical proposition; this is accurate in the sense that the 
coronavirus instantiates our phantasms, fears, and desires 
toward ghosts. In this regard, Derrida’s Specters of Marx 
provides us with a basic framework for understanding the 
coronavirus as a ghost. The first teaching of Derrida is that 
ghosts do not come at just any time but in spectral moments 
that do not belong to time. By pointing precisely to the 
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Abstract
COVID-19 pandemic is the first truly global crisis in the digital age. With death count worldwide reaching 586,000 merely 
7 months after its first outbreak in China in late December 2019 and 13.6 million cases reported in 188 countries and 
territories as of July 2020, this ongoing pandemic has spread far beyond domain of world health problem to become an 
unprecedented challenge facing humanity at every level. In addition to causing social and economic disruptions on a scale 
unseen before, it has turned the world into a site of biopolitical agon where science and reason are forced to betray 
their impotence against cultish thinking in the planetary endgame depicted in so many dystopian science fictions. It is in 
this context that this forum offers a set of modest reflections on the current impacts incurred by the COVID-19 virus. 
Blending ethnographic observations with theory-driven reflections, the five authors address issues made manifest by the 
crisis across different regions, while keeping their sight on the sociopolitical problems plaguing our life both individually 
and collectively. Taken together, they provide a grounded documentary for the archive that the COVID-19 virus is 
making us to construct.
Keywords
COVID-19, viruses, pandemic, global crisis
2 Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies 00(0)
present or now-time, Derrida (2006) regards spectral time 
as “a disjointed now that always risks maintaining nothing 
together in the assured conjunction of some context whose 
border would still be determinable” (p. 1). Second, a ghost 
is a phenomenon in the game of repetition and difference. 
Neither exclusively situated in life nor in death, neither vis-
ible nor invisible, a ghost is “the frequency of a certain vis-
ibility. But the visibility of the invisible. And visibility, by 
its essence, is not seen, which is why it remains epekeina tes 
ousias, beyond the phenomenon or beyond being” (Derrida, 
2006, p. 125). Third, to “make oneself fear” is essentially 
ineluctable in the experience of a ghost. One becomes 
frightened of a ghost “on the condition that one can never 
distinguish between the future-to-come and the coming-
back of a specter” (Derrida, 2006, p. 46). In other words, 
what one fears is not the ghost, but the fear, imagination, 
and one’s subject inspired by the ghost. Finally, “a ghost 
never dies, it remains always to come and to come-back” 
(Derrida, 2006, p. 123). Whatever repression the dead may 
suffer, the return of the dead is anticipated, and “this 
being-with specters would also be, not only but also, a 
politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations” 
(Derrida, 2006, p. xviii). In light of Derrida’s framework 
on specters, once the coronavirus finds a host, it starts to 
live a ghostly life.
The coronavirus pandemic irrupted during a time of tur-
moil. As the Chinese president Xi Jinping has expressed, 
the world is experiencing profound shifts unseen in a cen-
tury. While the trend of globalization is markedly receding, 
nationalism, popularism, and isolationism are on the rise. 
The eulogic discussions of “Chimerica,” a popular term 
coined by the British epidemiologist Neil Ferguson in 2007, 
are being replaced by the theories and practices of the 
China–U.S. decoupling. The trade dispute between China 
and the United States puts an end to the Chinese ideal of 
Great Harmony in the world. In addition, as his campaign 
slogan “America First” shows, Donald Trump epitomizes 
the idea of American exceptionalism. In traditional Chinese 
thinking, famine, natural disasters, and plague happen when 
the political order or legitimacy are out of joint. During this 
disjointed moment, a plague was anticipated, even fabri-
cated before it came. According to a widely circulated story 
in the We-media during the height of the coronavirus, Wang 
Yongyan, an academician specializing in Chinese medicine 
at the Chinese Academy of Engineering, predicted half a 
year ago that a plague would come after the dongzhi (Winter 
Solstice), one of the 24 Chinese solar periods. In addition, 
he predicted that the plague would last until next spring. In 
hindsight, rumors about a new virus were spreading right 
after the dongzhi. Or, simply put, divination went hand in 
hand with the plague during a time of disjointing, disjunc-
tion, or disproportion.
While scientists are still trying to track down patient 
zero, conspiracy theories about the origins of coronavirus 
have been spreading. Bat soup and biological warfare are 
on the top of the list of suspected criminals. Like ghosts, the 
coronavirus takes shape in the game of visibility and invis-
ibility. In this game, ways of seeing determine how a virus 
can be understood. Approximately made up of 0.125 
microns, the coronavirus can only be seen under an electron 
microscope, made visible with the help of scientific equip-
ment and representations. In contrast, a poet like Ezra 
Pound sees the invisible through his gifted imagination. His 
imaginative inspiration and aesthetic reflection allow his 
keen observation to become a line of poetic beauty and phil-
osophical complexity. Through this form of observation, an 
invisible apparition becomes visible in the faces of the 
crowd. Similarly, the depiction of a fictional killer-virus 
called Wuhan-400 in Dean Koontz’s 1981 novel The Eyes 
of Darkness, re-gained popularity among those who regard 
it as an imaginative depiction of the coronavirus. In line 
with this imaginative depiction, Mr. Wang, well-trained in 
traditional Chinese medicine, claimed that his prediction 
was based on his reading of the xiang (image) of the sky, 
earth, plants, animals, and human beings. Visible to the 
naked eye, xiang functions as the visible traces from which 
an invisible plague becomes visible to an expert in tradi-
tional Chinese medicine. In other words, with scientific 
support, talent, and training, people are able “to see this 
invisibility, to see without seeing, thus to think the body 
without body of this invisible visibility” (Derrida, 2006, p. 
187). In this way, the ghostly nature of the coronavirus lies 
in the different frequencies of its visibility.
However, despite our faith in being able to depict, and 
make distinctions between, the invisible and the visible, the 
way of seeing the coronavirus, especially in this time of tur-
moil, is politically conditioned and manipulated. When I 
took a night bullet train to Wuhan with my family for vaca-
tion, it felt like an ordinary Chinese family reunion trip dur-
ing the Spring Festival: carriages packed with passengers, 
luggage, excitement, anxiety, and weariness in the air. One 
of the reasons for the peaceful atmosphere was that China 
and the United States had signed a trade agreement a few 
days before, sending a false message to the world that ratio-
nality and peace would return. One thing was markedly 
noticeable on the train: Most passengers wore a facial mask 
for fear of an officially unidentified but unofficially SARS-
like virus. To my surprise, a line of masked faces was 
greeted at the exit by the smiling faces of relatives or 
friends, the indifferent faces of railroad workers, and the 
shrewd faces of barkers at the Hankou Railway Station. 
This lack of consistency indicates that aspects of the coro-
navirus were kept secret. Furthermore, this scenario at the 
station reminded me of a horrifying scene in the film The 
Cassandra Crossing, an eye-opening disaster thriller for my 
generation directed by George P. Cosmatos. In this harrow-
ing film, an international express carrying a virus-infected 
terrorist approaches a station at night. When the train 
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reached the station, the passengers, who were kept from the 
truth, were confronted with members of the U.S. army in 
white biological hazard protective suits lined up on both 
sides of the platform. In both cases, the dynamic of the vis-
ibility and the invisibility of a virus was of political signifi-
cance. The facial masks and the protective suits were used 
not only to protect people from a virus but also to make the 
secret of the virus both visible and invisible. In other words, 
political manipulation complicates the ways that a virus is 
seen and how the coronavirus, in particular, is seen as a 
political ghost.
The coronavirus pandemic frightened people because it 
looked like the return of a specter, namely SARS. Because 
of its fatality and residua, SARS remains an unresolved 
trauma for many Chinese. At the early stages of the corona-
virus pandemic, what was most frightening was its assumed 
high fatality rate. Similarly, the short notice given for the 
lockdown of Wuhan, a huge city of more than 10 million 
residents, sent a clear message to everyone that the novel 
coronavirus was the Grim Reaper. Corona, the brand of the 
first car I owned and of the beer I had on my first visit to a 
Mexican restaurant, was colored by images of a fearful 
virus, deserted streets, calm officials on TV news channels, 
and panicking crowds in Wuhan hospitals caught on video 
by the We-media. Unlike the countries who proposed or 
actually enacted herd immunity, the Chinese authorities 
imposed very tough immunity measures, a lesson learned 
from the 2003 SARS pandemic, when highways, the rail-
way station, and docks in my hometown were closed over-
night. Nursing homes were under quarantine; no visitors 
were allowed in. Local authorities advised avoiding public 
gatherings, including public square dancing and playing 
majiang. The most popular forms of social activity, espe-
cially for retired people, were no longer available.
After the initial panic, it was discovered that the fatality 
rate of the coronavirus was much lower than SARS. 
According to the World Health Organization, the SARS 
mortality rate worldwide was about 11%. In early February, 
the Chinese authorities claimed that the coronavirus mortal-
ity rate in Wuhan was about 5%. Subsequently, what elic-
ited fear in the population was the future-to-come, 
particularly in the form of social unrest. On one hand, 
stricter quarantine measures were implemented: All roads 
were quickly blocked with cranes or tankers or stones; vehi-
cles’ use was not allowed, unless a special permit was 
issued; all grocery shops, markets, restaurants, and hotels 
were shut down; residents were not allowed to exit their 
residential areas except for grocery shopping at an arranged 
supermarket. In addition, central and local authorities 
watched closely for other concerns, such as food shortages 
and the inflation of prices. Thanks partly to its rich agricul-
tural products in a land of fish and rice, the impact of the 
coronavirus on food supply and prices did not affect my 
hometown. However, under the restrictions put in place, my 
hometown looked like a ghost town, and the uncertainty of 
the future frightened people of all social strata.
In fact, what people fear most is that the coronavirus will 
never die and will come back again and again, either in the 
form of a future-to-come or a return of the dead. Regardless, 
despite the medical or political ambition to eradicate the 
coronavirus, we might have to accept the fact that the virus 
will co-exist with us forever. For instance, the coronavirus 
has been mutating, and the way the coronavirus replicates 
itself in the cells of other organisms is ubiquitous. This 
mechanism of repetition and difference functions both liter-
ally and metaphorically. On one hand, the coronavirus 
reproduces itself through difference. Merely a collection of 
genetic materials that seems to think with/like a human 
once it infects its host, the virus induces a feeling of the 
uncanny, a topic to which I will return later. In addition, 
news sources reported that infected patients tested positive 
again after they had been released from the hospital. Robert 
Redfield, Director of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, admitted that some deaths from coronavi-
rus have been discovered posthumously (CNN, 2020). In 
other cases, the coronavirus acted like a whimsical tyrant 
who inadvertently signed a death sentence. For example, 
the only cases of death in my residential area was an old 
couple who lived in an apartment very close to that of my 
parents. They got infected by their son and daughter who 
came back from Wuhan. What remained a mystery was that 
the son and the daughter had stayed with their parents for 
more than 20 days, much longer than the latent period of 
coronavirus. Days after they were hospitalized, they died 
one after another.
On the other hand, the coronavirus reproduces difference 
in its host organisms. The neighborhood my mother lives in 
is an acquittance community and an aging society. Cadres 
and volunteers from the neighborhood committee have dili-
gently attended to the needs of the old. Aware of the higher 
fatality rate of the old, an ageist exhortation to quarantine 
was broadcast repeatedly through a portable loudspeaker 
placed at the gate of the neighborhood committee building. 
As stigmatized targets, senior residents were susceptible to 
the emotion of shame and, for this reason, chose to stay at 
home. The use of broadcasts and the instigation of shame 
illustrates how the coronavirus (re)produces, moderates, 
and polices the line between the public and private spheres.
The coronavirus also changed the affective, moral, and 
power economy of the family. The Spring Festival is sup-
posed to be the perfect time for a temporary family reunion 
of joy and harmony. When the lockdown continued longer 
than everyone expected, generational conflicts broke out. In 
extreme cases, the political infected families while they 
were trying to contend with the coronavirus during quaran-
tine. For example, Fang Fang, a veteran Chinese writer who 
lived in Wuhan, posted her thoughts on life in quarantine on 
her or her friend’s Weibo account. Those posts were later 
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collected and published under the title Wuhan Diaries. 
Public opinion on those posts varied and eventually led to a 
political debate between left-wing and right-wing netizens, 
eventually affecting family members who conflicted in 
their attitudes toward the Wuhan Diaries.
Along with the coronavirus, the memory of personal, 
generational, and political traumas returned. SARS, the 
Cultural revolution, natural disasters, and national humili-
ties were recurring themes in representations of the corona-
virus. The suffering and trauma in the epicenter deserve an 
envoi/dedication, and efforts have been made to achieve 
this goal, such as daily national and international coverage, 
Fang Fang’s Wuhan Diaries, and We-media postings. In 
these kinds of representation, a rhetoric of “suffering as 
sublime” is usually at play. In addition, stigmatizing the suf-
fering of Others, or blaming the Other for one’s suffering, is 
another kind of dedication. Both kinds of representations of 
the coronavirus attempt to take the moral higher ground by 
attempting to fix the coronavirus as a mere object awaiting 
to be represented. No matter what position the representa-
tion takes toward the coronavirus and its significances, the 
will to truth turns a dedication quickly into a testimony and 
even a perjury.
A virus is an infectious agent that replicates only within 
a host organism. For the host, a coronavirus is a deadly 
stranger and an intimate family member at the same time. 
Familiar, frightening, and secretive, the coronavirus 
reminds us of the uncanny, as discussed by Freud. In his 
pioneering study, Freud focused on the unsettling psycho-
logical state of the uncanny. Distinct from the feeling of fear, 
the uncanny is a kind of terrifying feeling that is associated 
with something known and familiar. After an etymological 
investigation of the German words heimliche/unheimliche, 
and a close reading of Hoffmann’s story “The Sand-Man,” 
Freud (1964) unearthed the origins of the uncanny: “It may 
be true that the uncanny [unheimlich] is something which is 
secretly familiar [heimlich-heimisch], which has undergone 
repression and then returned from it, and that everything 
that is uncanny fulfills this condition” (p. 245). He also 
associates the feeling of the uncanny “with the omnipotence 
of thoughts, with the prompt fulfillment of wishes, with 
secret injurious powers and with the return of the dead” 
(Freud, 1964, p. 247). Following the lead of Freud, Derrida 
worked on the concept of the uncanny to engage with 
Marx’s concepts of repetition, specter, and fear. Refuting 
the claims that the tenants of Marxism have died, Derrida 
emphasizes the strange familiarity of the specter of Marxism 
in the age of advanced capitalism. As Derrida insists, the 
specter of Marxism will continue to return from the future 
to visit us, to live with us, and to alert us. Similarly, Derrida 
(2006) interprets the uncanny through the concept of abso-
lute hospitality, in which “one may deem strange, strangely 
familiar and inhospitable at the same time (unheimlich, 
uncanny)” (p. 212). Remaining structurally open to future 
interpretation, the uncanny in Derrida’s account presup-
poses a materialism without substance, a messianic without 
messianism.
Derrida’s understanding of the uncanny is critical to my 
reading of the coronavirus as a ghostwriter of envoi. As a 
ghostwriter, the coronavirus is a ghost who writes from the 
future. As a stranger and a family member, it writes with and 
in the place of the host. By writing an envoi, a kind of writ-
ing haunted by failure and repetition, the coronavirus makes 
itself visible and frightening in a spectral moment. However, 
the envoi is not exclusively governed by a ghostly logic that 
is followed by and instantiated through the coronavirus. In 
critiquing the tendency to unearth an ultimate truth, Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick & Frank (2003) regard affects as a pos-
sible way out of the binary opposition of truth and falsehood 
in representation. By invoking the power of the performativ-
ity of shame, they highlight the negative affects neglected by 
identity politics, dismissed and stigmatized:
Without positive affect, there can be no shame: only a scene 
that offers you enjoyment or engages your interest can make 
you blush. Similarly, only something you thought might delight 
or satisfy can disgust. Both these affects produce bodily 
knowledges. (Sedgwick & Frank, 2003, p. 116)
In their view, shame is neither subversive nor mandatory; it 
works with other affects, drives, and representations to 
adapt the body to its situation. Foregrounding bodily 
knowledge acquired through trauma commits us to think-
ing differently about representation and the envoi in ques-
tion. Fear of the coronavirus is not only the fear of a 
returning trauma as a ghostly logic in representation. More 
importantly, the coronavirus writes itself and writes about 
bodily memories of trauma in a constant play of material-
ization: inscribing fear in itself and on the body of the host 
permanently.
With the end of the lockdown in Hubei, the coronavirus 
pandemic is almost over in China. However, the coronavi-
rus has been sending, and will keep sending, its fearful 
envoi.
When the Virus Is Not Just a Virus: 
Nationalist Interpellation in a Global 
Pandemic (Srinivas Lankala)
The enduring sign of the Coronavirus pandemic for Indians 
was not related to medicine or public health. It was the 
unprecedented exodus of migrant workers from metropoli-
tan centers to their native rural districts, sometimes hun-
dreds of miles away (Mukhopadhyay & Naik, 2020; 
Petersen & Chaurasia, 2020). The scale of this migration 
was vast and is still being understood. It certainly provokes 
disturbing questions about urbanity and the fragility of a 
political compact that kept people in their place through 
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calibrated deprivation (Dahdah et al., 2020). But for our 
purposes here, I will explore the ways in which it under-
scores the varying effects of the pandemic on different 
classes of people and the diversity of its signification.
The virus in India is both a medical event to be dealt with 
through appropriate public health measures and a mediated 
discourse that has developed its own ramifications and 
responses. I argue that both forms of the virus have had 
tragic and miserable consequences, but on different classes 
and groups of people. Like the televised Persian Gulf war of 
1991 that Jean Baudrillard found to be a distinct and dis-
torted signifier of the actual fighting on the ground,1 the 
virus itself is not the same phenomenon once it is trans-
formed into a signifier for other meanings and purposes.
The novel coronavirus later named COVID-19 emerged 
in the public consciousness as a distinct problem with the 
rapid rise in infections in several Indian states by February 
2020. In March, the Government of India mandated an 
immediate “lockdown” of the entire country. This new term 
burned itself into the national consciousness and its many 
vernaculars almost instantly, as its meaning became physi-
cally apparent. It involved the physical arrest of people 
wherever they happened to be at the moment, and the prohi-
bition of all commerce, traffic, and circulation. It was 
announced with a 4-day notice period by the Prime Minister, 
in an eerie echo of a similar announcement in 2016 of the 
withdrawal of paper currency.2 That tragic farce had laid a 
historical precedent for this second tragedy to come. As a 
deeply iniquitous society and economy were forced to a 
halt, the effect was expectedly unequal. Metropolitan Indian 
citizens soon learned to cope with the new hardships of 
“work-from-home,” homeschooling, online classes and 
meetings, and such social-media-driven innovations as 
cooking and cleaning without domestic servants and enter-
taining themselves in their houses and apartments. The gov-
ernment also encouraged the adoption of derivative coping 
mechanisms as soon as they were observed in other coun-
tries: applauding medical workers from the safe confines of 
apartment balconies and terraces; singing, chanting and 
clanging metal plates and dishes with utensils in cacopho-
nous, solidarity of the gated classes; lighting lamps and 
candles; and waving mobile phone flashlights at appointed 
times (Krishnan, 2020).
However, the actual effect of the virus became insepa-
rable from the effect of the “lockdown.” The sudden impov-
erishment of the majority of the country’s population led to 
starvation, medical neglect, and a national panic. While 
invisible to the citizens in its first few weeks, it became 
impossible to ignore, when workers across Indian cities 
started to simply walk back to their native villages. Their 
exit from cities also emphasized the fragility of urban 
belonging: that in a crisis, Indian cities were fundamentally 
empty shells, drawing people not through cosmopolitan 
attractions or civic rewards but by rural misery.3 At this 
point, the virus was still largely a media phenomenon, while 
the “lockdown” was what had directly affected most 
Indians: The sudden disappearance of work, wages, com-
merce, and circulation magnified the precarity of urban 
existence. The largely informal national economy quickly 
unraveled in a crisis.
This crisis was exacerbated by the role of the virus in 
continuing the ideological and political discourses of the 
chaotic period immediately preceding the lockdown. The 
use of the virus to carry out “politics by other means” can be 
seen in other polities as well, but its entanglement with 
Indian politics is particularly useful as a means to under-
stand the virus as a set of signifying practices. The context 
of this political use of the virus as a signifier is also insepa-
rable from the highly mediatized nature of Indian politics 
and society.4
The virus emerged as a discursive phenomenon in India 
at a crucial juncture in a national conflict over changes to 
the country’s citizenship laws. With the rise to national 
power of the ruling Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, 
or the National Volunteers Organization—a fascist group 
founded in 1922), India’s national government had been 
attempting since 2014 to achieve its political goal of abol-
ishing its secular and liberal constitution through a steady 
dismantling of public institutions (Roy, 2020). This conflict 
worsened in 2019 with the re-election of the RSS-controlled 
government headed by the current Prime Minister, and the 
consequent repeal of laws that had hitherto guaranteed the 
autonomy of the occupied territory of Kashmir. This was 
followed by a critical change to citizenship laws to specifi-
cally exclude Muslims from gaining Indian citizenship and 
institute a new “citizens’ register” to determine afresh the 
legal status of all residents.5 With reports of the parallel 
construction of detention camps outside major cities, the 
fascist inspiration and ominous intent of the new laws 
became clearer and more immediate.6 Protests and political 
resistance to the new measures emerged across the country, 
and were met with violent responses from the police and 
RSS groups. Matters had reached a head when the nation-
wide lockdown was suddenly imposed.
Except in a few Indian states such as Kerala, with still 
functioning local health systems, the lockdown did not 
involve any public initiative to test or prevent the spread of 
the virus. Instead, in keeping with the ruling ideology of our 
time, citizens were mandated to protect themselves, on pain 
of being brutalized by the police if they failed. In this cha-
otic sauve qui peut scenario, the rhetoric of basic preventive 
measures took on ominous ideological connotations 
depending on who you were and where you lived. As it 
became clear that only access to clean running water, ade-
quate space, and a home to live in would guarantee the effi-
cacy of the public health guidelines, medical advice became 
meaningless for much of the country’s population, espe-
cially the inhabitants of vast informal urban settlements in 
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the metropolitan cities. In effect, a dual situation emerged: 
A parallel virus had infected the classes who lived in gated 
urban communities and formal neighborhoods and who fol-
lowed its progress in daily primetime news trackers. 
Positive cases, testing ratios, death rates, and other numbers 
soon flew across television and website screens in macabre 
charts, graphs, and complex animations, as breathless stu-
dio anchors enthusiastically tracked the competitive fatali-
ties across states, regions, cities, and countries. As the 
formal state and civil society response to the virus grew 
more and more into a media discourse, its actual effect on 
the population was determined by existing social conditions 
and ideological practices than by the ideals of public health.7
In the early period of its spread, the illusion of its control 
was maintained through the interpellation of the mass tele-
vision audience as ideal national subjects. In a series of 
televised speeches, the Prime Minister exhorted citizens 
to planned acts of mass discipline, such as the applause, 
noise-making, and lamp-lighting exercises mentioned 
earlier. It took several costly weeks for the citizens to 
realize that this national son-et-lumière had only served 
to deafen and obscure a different and more real virus that 
had silently spread illness and death among urban popu-
lations who did not have houses or apartments with bal-
conies. A starved public health system soon proved 
inadequate and unprepared. Because this real crisis was 
not mediated or televised, there was no appropriate or 
meaningful response to it.
The easy congruity of the eagerly adopted virus preven-
tion measures with the practice of caste-based rituals of dis-
crimination was not lost on most Indians (George, 2020). 
This fortunate coincidence enabled the easy normalization 
of virus prevention as a legitimization of existing hierarchi-
cal practices. The convenient prescription of social distanc-
ing appeared to keep the privileged class of wealthy and 
respectably middle-class white-collar workers as far away 
as possible from the physical contact or proximity of their 
social inferiors. The pandemic thus seemed tailor-made for 
defenders of Hindu caste hierarchies, a righteous and suit-
ably scientific legitimation of social discrimination.
The fantasy of caste purity would have remained an 
abhorrent social remnant if it had not become part of state 
policy in the last few years. But in the context of the state-
led legitimation of religious hierarchies and the conse-
quent onslaught on emancipatory laws, this entanglement 
of the virus with caste and with the violent hate crimes 
against Muslims acquired a dangerous dimension. It is 
this distrust of and disgust with a compromised public 
health system that drove so many Indians streaming out 
of cities and into the relative safety of their impoverished 
rural communities.
The alienation of Muslims as a national other has been a 
part of the basic doctrine of India’s current ruling group 
ever since its founders, awed by the Nazi policy of 
extermination, adopted a similar goal for the erasure of 
non-Hindu communities in India. The mass protests and 
popular uprising against the RSS’s attempts to irrevocably 
alter the basic structure of the country’s republican consti-
tution had reached a tipping point when the COVID-19 
epidemic was suddenly deemed emergent enough to 
impose an unprecedented “lockdown,” in effect a de facto 
police state across the country.
The imposition of the lockdown allowed police to 
destroy protest sites, detain protestors, and unleash a reign 
of terror across Indian cities. Caught in the initial crossfire 
were members of an apolitical Muslim religious group, the 
Tablighi Jamaat, whose convention in Delhi had been inter-
rupted by the lockdown. Jamaat members trapped in the 
organization’s premises by the curfew were found to be 
infected with the virus. The consequent media narrative of 
the discovery of the infection among the Jamaatis veered 
into the fantastical, with nightly news anchors debating the 
strategies of a “corona jihad” that was to be waged by mili-
tant Muslims using the virus as a weapon (Perrigo, 2020). 
This dog-whistle narrative of Muslim bodies as unclean 
spreaders of a foreign disease dovetails with similar narra-
tive frames used to portray Hindus from laboring and work-
ing castes as well.
The manufacture of conspiracies surrounding the coro-
navirus can be seen across the world and is not unique to 
India. A disturbingly large proportion of Americans, for 
example, appear to believe that the virus has been manu-
factured to enable mind-control through vaccination and 
5G cellular signals by a ruling elite (Fisher, 2020). On rare 
occasions, these conspiracies do spiral out into real effects 
such as the bombing of cellular towers in Britain and the 
anti-vaccination movement in the United States. In India, 
however, the covert encouragement of such theories by the 
state itself, to legitimize the hatred toward Muslims, exac-
erbates and normalizes the rumors as mainstream prime 
time news which is then amplified and shared through an 
organized social media campaign (Ellis-Petersen & 
Rahman, 2020).
The vilification of the Muslim Other serves two pur-
poses, one of furthering the state’s broader agenda of reli-
gious and caste purity, and the other more immediate goal 
of providing a scapegoat for the inescapable rise in infec-
tions and deaths due to the virus and the inability of the state 
and society to understand the crisis.
The brutal police crackdown that accompanied the lock-
down and the violence of its imposition across the country 
were a small reminder of the routinization of the “lock-
down” as a way of life in the occupied valley of Kashmir, 
part of the only Muslim-majority state in the Indian Union. 
The effects of the police state as a normalized entity have 
been multiplied since the abrogation in 2019 of constitu-
tional laws guaranteeing the region’s autonomy, even if 
such laws were honored more in the breach in preceding 
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decades (Zia, 2020). The uncanny resemblance of a public 
health curfew to a military occupation is not coincidental, 
but the result of the colonial origins of both, and of the state 
institutions they represent.
The symbiotic existence of caste-based discrimination, 
the extermination of a religious minority, and the colonial 
occupation of an entire province within the same body poli-
tic is made possible by the continuous interpellation of the 
mass of people to become national citizen-subjects. This 
call to obedience, broadcast daily through primetime televi-
sion and magnified through the near-mandatory use of 
mobile phones,8 is the only sign of a nation-state that is oth-
erwise absent in the real world. The failure to stop the 
spread of the real virus is obscured as the interpellated citi-
zen is urged, cajoled, and threatened to participate in the 
simulacral fight against a mediated virus in a purely semi-
otic realm. The washing of hands without the precious real-
ity of running water, the maintenance of “social distance” in 
the absence of space, the exhortation to “work from home” 
for a population that is not housed, and the discourses of 
online socialization and commerce are all much more than 
signs of mere denial: They are the components of this new 
semiotic space, enabling the call to national belonging in a 
new domain, bereft of its mooring in the world.
From a broader historical perspective, the coronavirus 
epidemic does not appear to have affected Indians as 
much as the far greater fatalities caused by more prosaic 
diseases, hunger, and the increasingly toxic air and water 
(Rukmini, 2020). What has caused the greatest pain and 
panic is the response to the epidemic. This response has 
been not to the virus itself, but to a simulacral virus that 
appears to occupy the same space and shares the same 
name as COVID-19, but which is a mere signifier, point-
ing to other, older evils. Like Baudrillard’s hyperreal war, 
it has surpassed the real virus itself and has come to 
occupy its place. It cannot be wished away or prevented 
with a vaccine, it needs a response in kind: of new coun-
ter-signs and counter-discourses.
Reimagination of East Asia in the 
Chinese Public Discourse of COVID-19 
(Yuan Gong)
A catastrophic pandemic unseen in a century, the current 
raging of COVID-19 around the globe has undoubtedly 
produced a unique symbolic site for global, regional, and 
national imaginations. As the earliest epicenter of this infec-
tious illness, China has witnessed the proliferation of dis-
courses about the evolution of the pandemic on various 
media platforms, through which the Chinese public has the 
rare chance to reflect on important issues regarding identity 
construction, social reformation, and nation building. While 
much attention has been paid to the stigmatization of China 
in Euro-American politics, media, and everyday whisper 
that label the natural coronavirus as a cultural and ethnic 
fault (Fu, 2020), what has been overlooked is how China 
has portrayed other countries in this global health crisis, 
especially those surrounding nation-states in the same geo-
political area. East Asia, or the Sinosphere in the broader 
sense, with the collective memory of fighting SARS in 
2003, is thought to have responded to COVID-19 more effi-
ciently than many Western countries (Salmon, 2020). How, 
then, is the East Asian encounter with COVID-19 depicted 
in the Chinese public discourse? How does such depiction 
envisage China’s relations with neighboring countries and 
its position in the area?
In this essay, I discuss the ways in which the coronavirus 
pandemic has been appropriated by the Chinese public for a 
(re)imagination of East Asia. By exploring the evolving 
representations of its neighboring countries throughout the 
epidemic on Chinese media platforms including Weibo, 
WeChat, and Zhihu, I argue that the talk of the regional 
responses to COVID-19 envisions a China-centered union 
of selected East Asian countries in parallel with the histori-
cal tributary system of the Sinosphere. Through the expres-
sion of the nostalgia for Imperial China, the discursive 
reconstruction of the East Asian identity is a ratification of 
China’s contemporary ambition to reclaim its geopolitical 
dominance.
Mutual Support for Regional Crisis
Synchronized with the rapid transmission of the coronavi-
rus in China and East Asia between January and March 
2020, the Chinese public in this early phase drew close 
attention to the unfolding of the epidemic in its nearby 
countries, and Japan and South Korea in particular. With the 
disease breakout involving Diamond Princess (Japan) and 
Shincheonji Church of Jesus (South Korea) frequently mak-
ing news headlines, the discussions of how those countries 
responded to COVID-19 flourished online, which, in com-
bination with the continuous debates over China’s own pan-
demic threat management, contributed to the imagination of 
the COVID-19 rampancy as a regional challenge that China 
and its neighbors faced together.
Central to the discursive formation of this imagined com-
munity was the celebration of the incessant interaction and 
cooperation between China and some East Asian countries 
to combat the virus collectively. In the wake of the outbreak 
when China was threatened by the crumbling of its health 
care system, the countries under the spotlight—Japan and 
South Korea—were widely appraised for the sympathetic 
and supportive approaches they took to help China over-
come the severe shortage of medical resources. The media 
reports of Japanese and South Korean governments leading 
the international aids to China (Gong, 2020) were echoed by 
numerous warm anecdotes on social media championing the 
heartfelt support from their people. Perhaps the most 
8 Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies 00(0)
well-known story of this kind, a Japanese institution wrote a 
Chinese-language verse on the boxes of masks it donated to 
the province of Hubei: “Rivers low, mountains high; The 
same moon in the sky” (trans. Zhao, 2020) (“山川异域，风
月同天”), which immediately went viral online because of 
its signification of the long-lasting friendship between China 
and Japan. According to Account of the expedition to the east 
by the Great Master (唐大和上东征传) written by Omi no 
Mifune (淡海三船) (see Wong, 2018), this sentence was 
from an ancient poem written on the edges of the Buddhist 
robes Japanese missions (遣唐使) brought to Tang China as 
the tribute from Prince Nagaya (長屋王). Given its profound 
roots in the history of Japanese envoys to Imperial China 
learning from the Chinese culture and civilization, this verse 
went beyond re-fostering the traditional Sino-Japanese soli-
darity. Analogizing Japan’s mask donation with ancient 
Japanese envoys’ gifts, it also evoked the retrospective com-
memoration of the hierarchy between China and Japan in 
history which almost vanishes in the modern era. Therefore, 
the popularity of this verse may indicate the aspiration for 
the reoccurrence of such bi-lateral relations.
Indeed, this was only one example of the ubiquitous 
imaginary of the pan-East Asian cooperation and exchange 
of goods and information as a modern emulation of the trib-
utary system through which Imperial China maintained its 
diplomatic and trade relations to neighboring countries and 
consolidated its dominance in the region for over a millen-
nium. After China started to keep the pandemic under con-
trol and resume the production of medical supplies, this 
metaphor was further perpetuated in an attempt to accentu-
ate that China’s supplies of medical goods and anti-epi-
demic lessons to nearby countries drastically outnumbered 
what it was initially given. On Weibo, China’s return of 
masks and respirators to its neighbors was often explicitly 
compared with the “vassals’ gifts” Chinese emperors 
assigned to tributary states in posts like this:
Tribute is both the highest form of alliance and an advanced 
way of investment, but (this time) it is based on masks! 
Recently, Xinwu District in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province donated 
50,000 to Toyokawa, Aichi Prefecture in Japan in return for the 
4,500 masks, protective clothing and other anti-epidemic 
materials Toyokawa donated to Xinwu District in February. 
(Weibo source, March 25, 2020)
This nostalgic use of metaphor implies a crucial under-
tone of Sinocentrism of the public imagination of the com-
munity comprising China and bordering countries fighting 
against the coronavirus. The tracing of the origin of East 
Asian solidarity to the past is suggestive of the ambition of 
the present. The Chinese public not only fantasizes about a 
reunion of China, Japan, and South Korea for COVID-19 
but more importantly yearns for the recovery of their 
nation’s leadership and centrality in this battle.
Victory of the “Confucius East”
As the coronavirus expands rampantly to the rest of the 
world from March 2020 onward, Chinese media coverage 
quickly catches up with the shift of the epicenters from East 
Asia to Europe and North America and reformulates the 
pandemic as a global health crisis. Against the depiction of 
how COVID-19 created chaos, helplessness, and dysfunc-
tion in Western societies stands the stark contrast of East 
Asia as a safer zone where the outbreaks have been largely 
contained with success. With the similar control of cases 
less than 20,000, Japan and South Korea remain at the heart 
of this imagined safe zone in company with China even 
though the reality has seen even fewer confirmed cases in 
other parts of Asia as well as the recent resurgence of virus 
spreading in all these three countries.
This rhetoric is in concert with the prevalence of online 
deliberations about why East Asia as an area has performed 
better than other parts of the globe in the containment of the 
virus. At the core of these discourses lies the construction of 
an East/West binary which frames the global responses to 
the pandemic into a competition in which “We” (the East/
East Asia) have triumphed “Them” (the West/Euro-
America). Although China and neighboring countries 
diverge in the official approaches to handle the pandemic, 
their relative efficiency in virus containment in comparison 
with the West is considered to be guided uniformly by the 
cultural values they share as part of the “Confucius East.” In 
particular, collectivism—the principles of prioritizing com-
munity interests to personal interests, pursuing social har-
mony, compliance to authority, avoid causing inconvenience 
to others—has been glorified as the main drive for the peo-
ple in East Asia to more effectively cope with the govern-
mental strategies in contact tracing, testing, social 
distancing, and mask wearing. Similarly, the regional coop-
eration in the pandemic management is regarded as a mani-
festation of these values. For example, the reflections on 
how South Korea has set a model of disease control using 
mass tracing and testing tend to recognize the smooth 
uptake of this procedure facilitated by Koreans’ collectivist 
mind-set that downplays individual privacy and complies 
with the data-mining measures to track and publicize their 
locations, activities, and close contacts. Meanwhile, other 
popular discussions blame the religiosity of the Shincheonji 
Church members whose gatherings caused the initial 
COVID outbreak in South Korea, which is reflected from 
the titles of Zhihu posts that describe the diffusion of the 
virus through “Hallelujah” such as “The occupation of 
South Korea by Covid-19, everything has to start from 
‘Hallealia’” and “South Korean cult Hallelujah devastated 
the country.”
Apparently, these titles have no intention to mask the 
underlying tone mocking at the role of Christianity in the 
acceleration, not mitigation, of disease spreading, which 
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further serves as a foil to the power of Confucianism to help 
South Korea navigate away from the disaster. In fact, satire 
targeting at Christianity represents the broader criticism of 
Western cultural values in hindering the efficacious enforce-
ment of restrictive and surveilling measures against the 
coronavirus. The East Asian identity is thus reaffirmed 
through the clashes between the Eastern and Western civili-
zations. However, it is worth noting that the narratives 
about the East Asian conquest of COVID-19 are again per-
meated with the metaphor of the tributary system delineat-
ing China as the leader and role model in this imagined 
“safe zone.” Not only does the attribution of the regional 
success to Confucianism call up the historical Chinese cen-
trality in the Sinosphere but the emphasis on China’s ability 
to offer lessons and instructions from its early experience 
for its neighbors to benefit from also ratifies the restoration 
of the “teacher/student” relation between Imperial China 
and pre-modern Japan and Korea.
A Process of Inclusion and Exclusion
Far from a total reenactment of the historical Sinosphere, 
this Chinese imaginary of East Asia engages with a pur-
poseful selective process that amplifies China’s solidarity 
with some East Asian countries but simultaneously mutes 
others in the same region. As remarked earlier, a majority of 
the online narratives about the cooperative responses to 
COVID-19 in East Asia revolves around China, Japan, and 
South Korea, with less frequent inclusion of Singapore as 
well as occasional reference to such countries as Mongolia 
and Myanmar. This emphasis on forming a coalition with 
Japan and South Korea is compatible with China’s long-
term agenda of promoting and dominating the China–
Japan–South Korea union (中日韩一体化), which was 
recently reiterated by the three governments’ consensus to 
speed up the negotiation of the free trade zone (中日韩自贸
区) (Wang, 2019). In this sense, the COVID-19 crisis has 
offered a discursive site for the Chinese state to rebuild this 
trilateral bond and remodel its significant neighbors whose 
national images, due to the respective disputes around 
Diaoyu Islands and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense), have been negative in China for almost a decade.
While the China–Japan–South Korea triangle is romanti-
cized in connection with other small countries, the alien-
ation of some Confucius societies from this imagined 
“cooperative” East Asia is quite striking, especially given 
the outstanding results some of them have produced in the 
prevention of disease transmission. The first excluded cat-
egory includes Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau—the terri-
tories outside the mainland in the Great China area. Whereas 
Macau is often forgotten by the media as it has always been, 
both Taiwan and Hong Kong are widely criticized and 
mocked for their attempt to politicize the pandemic as a 
weapon to confront Beijing and increase international 
recognition. The second group pertains to North Korea and 
Vietnam—the authoritarian states that have close political 
and ideological bonds with China. For instance, North 
Korea has been constantly questioned and satirized because 
of the lack of transparency in the disclosure of its epidemic 
circumstances. Vietnam’s outstanding handling of the virus 
which led to only 334 confirmed cases and 0 death was 
nearly silenced in the mainstream media coverage. In the 
unusual reference to Vietnam in some Zhihu conversations, 
Vietnam’s success was rarely celebrated but considered as a 
“threat” to China’s leadership in containing the pandemic in 
the area.
The trivialization and exclusion of these countries/
regions from the Chinese imagination of East Asia as a col-
lective force fighting against COVID-19 is not unexpected. 
In the first place, the negative attitudes toward them (except 
Macau) reflects a backlash against the restrictive, non-
cooperative methods those governments have enforced to 
block the virus from mainland China (e.g., full border clo-
sure; ban on exports of medical supplies), which signifies 
their resistance to be incorporated into the modern tributary 
system Chinese people have aspired. Yet for Taiwan and 
Hong Kong, this exclusion repeats the endeavor of Chinese 
official propaganda to erase the distinction between them 
and the mainland and disavow their political autonomy. 
Instead of being completely out of the picture, their 
responses to the coronavirus are mainly discussed as part of 
the Chinese experience to consolidate the national identity. 
For North Korea and Vietnam, the negative impression may 
partly result from China’s ongoing diplomatic conflicts 
with them in recent years regarding the South China Sea 
and denuclearization, respectively. Nevertheless, the shak-
ing of the “socialist brotherhood” on the matter of COVID-
19 also implies the reluctance of the Chinese public to 
articulate a regional identity around the axis of a shared 
political regime. In fact, assimilating itself with ideological 
and political allies is likely to obscure the focus of this 
imaginary on China’s historical and cultural alignment with 
Japan and South Korea.
Epilogue
As COVID-19 begins to shift both the scholarly and media 
focus on an international scale to reconsidering the dark 
sides of globalization (Chan & Haines, 2020) and mourn-
ing for the disruption of European Union (Trofimov & 
Pancevski, 2020), China’s reversed agenda of imagining a 
regional union is stunningly intriguing. On one hand, the 
eagerness to build solidarity with East Asian countries 
represented by Japan and South Korea might be a strategy 
to react to the racialization of COVID-19 as a “Chinese 
virus” and the demonization of China as a “public enemy” 
and “trouble maker” in the Euro-American political and 
media agenda (Viala-Gaudefroy & Lindaman, 2020). By 
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articulating China’s resemblance (and collaboration) with 
the bordering democratic capitalist states (rather than the 
“socialist brothers”) in the “Confucius-inspired” success 
of halting the virus, the public discourse strives to con-
struct a collective identity of the East so as to brush off 
China’s label of the Other imposed by the Western imagi-
nation. Ironically, this consolidation of the Eastern iden-
tity also serves as a repercussion to otherize the West as 
the loser to the coronavirus.
On the other hand, the rise of this East Asian imaginary 
centering around China’s historical and cultural bonds with 
Japan and South Korea has far-reaching implications for 
China’s geopolitical strategies beyond the COVID-19 pan-
demic and the realm of public health. Rested upon the trope 
of the imperial tributary system, this imagination reflects 
how the Chinese public discourse echoes the state ambition 
to recuperate the historical dominance of China in the 
Sinosphere, which is part of Chinese Communist Party’s 
long-term project of “the great revival of the Chinese nation” 
(中华民族伟大复兴), or in Xi Jinping’s term, the “Chinese 
Dream” (中国梦). Incorporating Japan and South Korea—
the most important American allies in East Asia—into the 
imagined tributary network might serve the specific purpose 
of weakening the U.S. hegemony in the region (see Ikenberry, 
2004), whereas the tactic exclusion of North Korea and 
Vietnam indicates the indifference of many Chinese to the 
state’s political and ideological “comrades” (whose tradi-
tional alliance with China has often proven itself unstable 
and delusionary in the changeable economic and political 
dynamics in East Asia). More importantly, this selective rei-
magination of the Eastern union expresses the Chinese pub-
lic’s nostalgic ideal of the nation’s revival, which dreams of 
a return to the Middle Kingdom, the empire that reunites and 
leads East Asia through culture and history.
Making Viruses Matter (Xuefeng Feng)
The Toxic Present
During the year 2020, which is anticipated to be the warm-
est year in human history, we failed to stop the rampant 
spread of a coronavirus called COVID-19 and its disas-
trous impact on societies and individual lives. Unlike its 
“cousin” SARS, which broke out in early 2003 and van-
ished into thin air largely because of rising temperatures, 
the current respiratory epidemic has yet to show any sign 
of amelioration with the arrival of summer.
News photos have shown audiences an incredibly 
bleak, bizarre, and somewhat surreal picture of life during 
the pandemic. Streets are evacuated. Stores are closed. 
Public services are paralyzed. Modernized cities have 
become empty and ghostly quiet. Only scattered people 
equipped with medical face masks walk anxiously in this 
futurist, apocalyptic scene.
To use Timothy Morton’s concept, the COVID-19 pan-
demic has become a “hyperobject,” a phenomenon that pos-
sesses an ahuman time scale and an extremely diffused 
quality in occupying space. In such a space–time reconfigu-
ration, or, in plain language, during this type of disaster, 
humankind becomes an obsolete idea, as humans no longer 
play a meaningful role in the space–times created by and for 
“hyperobjects.” Unfortunately, such a concept bares rele-
vance in light of the uncontrollable proliferation of the 
coronavirus across the globe at this juncture.
Worse still, some epidemiologists warn that a new round 
of outbreak will likely occur soon in the coming fall. A pos-
sible scenario could repeat the conditions after the 3/11 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, when breathing with 
face masks, people eventually became accustomed to a state 
of emergency as the conditions for living and dying in the 
Anthropocene. “[P]oison has become a normal feature of 
daily life, the second nature we have to inhabit” (Berardi, 
2012, p. 12). While one can attribute the deterioration of 
nature to neoliberalism and its disastrous governance, this 
essay, rather, speculates on what foregrounds the involu-
tional relationship between humans and the earth beyond 
the “nature-culture” divide. Whether one is willing to admit 
or not, viruses are neither creation ex nihilo nor culturally 
and politically constructed representation. Instead, they are 
beings that have always been part of earth’s composition.
Neither Object nor Subject
In a prophetic book, The Natural Contract, the late 
Philosopher Michel Serres (1995) describes the evolution 
of the earth’s composition. In ancient law and modern sci-
ence, nature was treated as an objective reference point, 
because it had no subject. Existing objectively “out there,” 
the earth was a space that did not depend on humans but 
only acted passively in relation to causality. Yet, witnessing 
the ecological crisis arising in the 20th century, humans 
realized that the earth has been affected by our behavior and 
is now behaving like an aberrant subject! In recent scholar-
ship, this subject has been referred to as Gaia, the capricious 
goddess of the earth (see Latour, 2014, p. 3).
The earth is full of action and so is COVID-19. As 
described in news reports, the coronavirus looks for and 
hijacks its hosts; it finds easy purchase on, and takes control 
of, human bodies; it kills many, but not all, of its hosts so as 
to keep moving, spreading, replicating, and surviving. It 
would be impossible to talk about the virus without refer-
ring to those actions. Cited by the Washington Post, a virol-
ogist came up with a vivid analogy for viruses by comparing 
them with destructive burglars. “They break into your 
home, eat your food, use your furniture and have 10,000 
babies” (Kaplan et al., 2020).
As the word “object” refers to entities that are inanimate 
and subject to chains of causality, viruses, in this sense, 
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hardly fit into this definition. For instance, COVID-19 
remains mostly enigmatic, not least because it is considered 
strikingly sneaky—“the virus doesn’t really want to kill us. 
It’s good for them, good for their population, if you’re 
walking around being perfectly healthy,” said another virol-
ogist in the same Washington Post article (Kaplan et al., 
2020). Besides doing things such as breaking-into, eating, 
and having-babies, the virus is further endowed with inten-
tions—it does not want to kill us!
However, the coronavirus should not be mistaken for a 
subject, especially a subject–agent, which is historically 
associated with liberal humanism since the Enlightenment 
and which is deeply rooted in the “nature-culture” divide, 
an ontological regime referred to by Latour as “the Modern 
Constitution” (see Latour, 1993b). The idea of the subject as 
a product of Euro-American modernity is indivisible from 
its aim to achieve individual sovereignty and autonomy. In 
a politico-legal sense, bounded individualism is the most 
evolved form of this idea in the wake of the global expan-
sion of capitalism. Faced with an unprecedentedly active 
earth in the late 20th century, nonetheless, this anthropocen-
tric conception of the subject–agent has been confronting 
exponential challenges, among which the current coronavi-
rus pandemic constitutes the latest one. To be clear, the term 
“subject” is a mismatch for COVID-19, not because it is 
agentless and incapable of doing the same things that 
humankind does. The contrary is true: The state of being of 
the virus—what it is—can unfold only through its actions 
and long after its performances. At stake for the virus and 
humans is that there are “no pre-constituted subjects and 
objects, and no single sources, unitary actors, or final ends” 
(Haraway, 2003, p. 6) Far from being a de-animated object, 
or an anthropomorphized subject, Gaia, the increasingly 
“rioting” earth, is a collective of actions that distributes 
agency in heterogeneous and surprising ways. As a result, 
“we must not believe in advance that we know whether we 
are talking about subjects or objects, men or gods, animals, 
atoms, or texts” (Latour, 1993a, p. 167), and also viruses 
until their actions are captured, and rendered into shapes—
whether the shape of a human or of a virus.
Staying With the Trouble!
The story of the human-centered history is being replaced 
by an explosion of narratives about the increasingly ani-
mated and animating earth. However, the dualism of the 
subject versus the object, unfortunately, is still perniciously 
conserved in the mainstream reaction to the COVID-19 
pandemic. When societies are forced to act on the pan-
demic, the virus is almost exclusively treated as an object 
subject to the chain of causality.
This tendency is clearly reflected in the mobilization of 
wartime rhetoric and discourses in conjunction with gov-
ernments’ anti-epidemic measures. For instance, when 
visiting Wuhan right after its lockdown, Sun Chunlan, 
China’s Vice Premier, warned that the country was facing 
“wartime conditions.” Likewise, only 1 month later, 
President Donald Trump declared a national state of emer-
gency over the coronavirus outbreak in the United States. 
In this antagonistic discourse, contending with the virus, a 
not-yet-tamed and potentially threatening other, is framed 
as a relationship between humans and their enemies. For 
those who believe humans and only humans make history, 
a self-proclaimed war on the virus is unavoidable! Peace, 
accordingly, is only imaginable to be reached, or more pre-
cisely restored, to an already existing order, established 
primarily for humans.
Mobilized to describe the relationship between COVID-
19 and humans, “war” is a terrible and even dangerous 
choice in terminology, due to its undertone of human excep-
tionalism. In fact, nearly 90% of the cells in a human body 
is “part of a vast community of companion species, particu-
larly bacteria and viruses” (Smart & Smart, 2017, kindle 
72). Unfortunately, most humans have yet to learn the 
meaning of living and becoming-with these beings who are 
made by and making humans at the same time.
In her book Staying With the Trouble: Making Kin in the 
Chthulucene, Donna Haraway (2016) invites readers to 
contemplate our troubling present, the Chthulucene, an 
emerging regime of naturecultures, as opposed to the 
“nature-culture” divide. Contrasting to the discourse of the 
Anthropocene and the Capitalocene, both of which are 
conceived as human-induced condition, the “Chthulucene” 
is, first and foremost, concerned with earth beings who live 
in “manifold forms and manifold names in all the airs, 
waters, and places of earth”—they are monsters which 
“demonstrate and perform the material meaningfulness of 
earth processes” (Haraway, 2016, p. 2). The vicious coro-
navirus is evidently one of these monsters. Despite the 
havoc it is creating in the present, the epidemic is a mani-
festation of the biotic and abiotic powers inherent in earthly 
actors and is part of “ongoing multispecies stories . . . in 
times that remain at stake” (Haraway, 2016, p. 55). As 
implied by the title, one of the valuable lessons of 
Haraway’s book is that, for humans in particular, there 
might be no better option other than to stay with troubles, 
of which humans are never innocent.
Staying with the troubles demands caring for all the 
threads that bind us together and make our existence possi-
ble in the first place—humans are made by countless earth 
beings and vice versa. It also means that we are required to 
weave unexpected and even dangerous connections with 
others, in Haraway’s (2016) words, making kin as oddkin 
“in unexpected collaborations and combinations . . . We 
become-with each other or not at all” (p. 4). This insight is 
particularly useful for thinking about viruses. Because 
viruses have “no cellular machinery of their own, they 
become intertwined with ours. Their proteins are our 
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proteins” (Kaplan et al., 2020). In this sense, the evolution 
of humans and viruses is inseparable from the process of 
involution of the two into one. In other words, becoming-
with means that, by definition, a “we” always precedes an 
“I,” a “you,” or a “they.”
The so-called “asymptomatics” provide an excellent 
example of this point. Asymptomatics refer to those who 
test positive for COVID-19 but, confusingly, do not suffer 
from illness or show any symptom of the disease. 
Asymptomatic infections or carriers are possibly greater in 
number than those with symptoms. At this point, it is impos-
sible to decide which of the two types is more typical of 
COVID-19 infections, because, as a researcher at the 
University of Oxford says, “there is not a single reliable 
study to determine the number of asymptomatics” 
(Shukman, 2020). In the same news report, Neil Hall, a bio-
medical expert, suggests considering asymptomatic cases 
of the coronavirus as the “dark matter” of the epidemic, as 
invisible and not-yet identified dark matter is believed to 
make up most of the matter in the universe.
Despite the fact that no conclusion has been reached 
about the enigmatic phenomenon of asymptomatics, the dif-
ferences that manifest among patients reveal that the virus, 
and the particular cases of infection, should be examined as 
specific units. In other words, between the virus and 
humans, the specificity of an encounter matters. Unlikely to 
be autopoietic systems that reproduce autonomous units, 
the virus and an infected body constitute a collectively pro-
duced, sympoietic system that does not have self-defined 
spatial or temporal boundaries. In these cases, and from a 
non-anthropocentric, philosophical point of view, the idea 
of bounded individualism has to be discarded for good. 
Beyond the divide between the subject and the object, what 
emerges are ontologically heterogeneous practitioners who 
are involved in each other’s lives. Besides evolution, living 
also relies on involution.
Without any intention of “romanticizing” COVID-19 
and the current pandemic, staying with the trouble, as artic-
ulated by Haraway (2016), is “to make kin in lines of inven-
tive connection as a practice of learning to live and die well 
with each other in a thick present” (p. 1).
Mattering Viruses
The coronavirus does not happen as a matter of fact, which 
“passively” waits to be discovered, investigated, tamed, or 
neutralized by “active” humans. What we call the COVID-
19 pandemic manifests itself as a differentiating and rela-
tional effect because it matters by bringing into being 
various relations between humans, and between humans 
and their oddkin. In this view, science is only one practice 
among many others to capture the efficacy of its mattering. 
In addition to biomedical measures, a more critical question 
for the coronavirus crisis is “what method does the matter 
demand” (Thompson, 2018, p. 13)? Proposed by Haraway 
for living in the Chthulucene, the string figure might also 
serve as an appropriate method and image for the pandemic, 
characterized by its exceptional contagiousness and interac-
tivity. Consisting of “passing on and receiving, making and 
unmaking, picking up threads and dropping them,” the 
string figure is all about “becoming-with each other in sur-
prising relays” (Haraway, 2016, p. 3). Crucial to this method 
is that it does not guarantee what is obtained turns out to be 
good in the end, because living itself has become so danger-
ous in this very thick present—agencies are distributed, 
conflicting, and entangled in a myriad of practitioners, 
human and non-human alike.
In this pandemic, we are all playing the game of string 
figures with our oddkin. It is not beneficial to judge in 
advance who is a subject and who is an object, or which one 
is active and which one passive, as all participants might be 
capable of something that matters in one way or another. For 
example, one thing that the respiratory disease teaches us is 
that not only breathing matters but also the manner how one 
breathes matters to others. Life and death happen inside spe-
cific connections and their mattering in mundane, and even 
fleeting, encounters. Making COVID-19 matter requires us 
to reanimate “what is coming into states of matter and mat-
tering in bodies, stories, acts, and events” (Stewart, 2018, p. 
24), in other words, in the vicissitudes of our ordinary lives. 
For the future of this thick present, one key is to stop imagin-
ing the crisis of the coronavirus as something wholly predi-
cated on effective vaccines and scientific solutions. Instead, 
humans must learn to connect and also care for threads, 
some of which are obvious, some elusive, some vicious and 
dangerous, and some fictional. We may need to discard 
terms such as “overcoming” or “solution,” and turn to terms 
like “participation” concerning all that we are uncertain of 
but have to live and become with, together, in the “metamor-
phic zone” called the earth (Latour, 2014, p. 13).
Of Viruses and Men (Briankle G. Chang)
What does it mean, the plague? It is life, that is all.
—Albert Camus, The Plague
The most abundant biological entities on Earth, viruses are 
forever and everywhere. Suspended between living and being 
dead, they are simply there, a slimy strip of ribonucleic acid 
(RNA), as biologists tell us. Poorer in life than tardigrades, 
incapable of movement, and having no logistic of their own, 
they ride on and feed off others to replicate themselves, to 
become the viruses that they are. As smart schoolchildren 
know, they are transmissible and must be so transmitted as to 
go viral, to become the viruses as we know them.
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Viral Media
Dependent entirely on carriers, that is, exploiting others’ 
hospitality, without which they have no life (but also no 
death either), viruses exemplify transmissibility. They live 
and thrive, as it were, only if their hosts are susceptible, in 
motion, and in contact and they die or die down when sus-
ceptible hosts are either unavailable or no longer hospitable. 
Defined, that is, made finite, by transmissibility, and yet 
transcending its barren finitude through parasitism, viruses 
exist and operate like pure media, self-generating and self-
generated by being entirely coterminous with the channel 
through which they flow and multiply. Interpolating and 
encoding themselves in the metabolic cycle of others, 
thereby reproducing themselves passive-actively, they 
mediate by colonizing others and, in so doing, mediate 
themselves by proxy, going about so energetically and 
indiscriminately as to cause the demise and thus thwarting 
unwittingly their own propagation. If viruses communicate 
anything, if their shadowy occupation of host bodies sends 
any message, it is their very own communicability, their 
ability to disseminate themselves over a large population 
with effort less than minimal.
Although all over creation and in abundance, most of 
the viruses cause us no harm and we pay them little atten-
tion, even though they populate our body and capitalize on 
its resources. They become a matter of grave concern 
when they infect us, when they not only put themselves 
inside (in-ficere) our body and stain its normal function-
ing, but also threaten to afflict as many people as their 
“infectivity” attacks. More dangerous and less tamable 
than most microbes, viruses invade our body and compro-
mise it at the cellular level. They do not just make us sick; 
they bring about plague.
Once seen as a cause of infection, viruses accrue signifi-
cance and take on the label “pathogens.” To refer to viruses 
as pathogens implies that they are “medicalized,” that they 
not only enter into a relation with humans who regard them 
as toxic and virulent, but are also seen as a problem to be 
addressed in a methodical, systematic, that is, “scientific,” 
manner. It is through this medicalization that viruses are 
individuated and identified as a distinct biological entity 
and, having been so captured and given a name—for exam-
ple, H1N1, Mers-CoV, SARS-CoV-2, COVID-19, and the 
like—by what might be called the “clinical gaze” and its 
taxonomic procedures, they enter into sciences and become 
a focus of medical research, made all the more pressing if 
and when they create public health crisis. More than one 
hundred years after Martinus Beijerinck gave the name con-
tagium virum fluidum (contagious living fluid) to the incit-
ant of Tobacco mosaic first discovered by Adolf Mayer and 
Dimitri Ivanovsky, viruses are now actively collected, clas-
sified, and manipulated by scientists in highly restricted 
spaces called laboratories, most of which, like the viruses 
housed carefully therein, are hidden from public eyes. 
While slimy poisons were once thought to be sent down by 
God to punish us for our sins, we now see viruses not only 
as an object of scientific investigation but also as a medical 
challenge that nature poses to us as biological creatures on 
Earth. Like birds, bats, and rats, we are all equal opportu-
nity hosts to killer germs.
Pandemics, Unde Venistis?
Not all viruses are fully pathogenic, but pathogenic viruses 
are ever ready to go viral when the conditions are ripe. 
However, although viral infection may break out and spill 
over, it does not mean that there is a pandemic. 
“Pandemics,” as virologists tell us, “begin when a brand-
new virus infects a human who also at that point is able to 
transmit the virus to other humans” (Buettner, 2020). Two 
points should be noted without delay. First, pandemics are 
not created by transmission of viruses from some source to 
humans, but from humans to humans. Breakouts of viral 
infections among members of a primate community deep 
in the Amazon rainforests, for example, may be large scale 
and may disturb ecological balance alarming to conserva-
tionists, but they do not for all that count as pandemics in 
the sense that the term is properly used. Viruses might 
infect one or more individuals, but humans are responsible 
for creating the conditions that transform infections to out-
breaks and outbreaks into pandemics. Pandemics, in other 
words, are not natural or biological phenomena; they name 
a human crisis, a contagious malady plaguing humans 
who are both agents and patients at the same time. 
Contagious diseases are disastrous to all, locked, as we 
are, in the same bubble in which microbes live and grow, 
but pandemics are decidedly more pernicious in that we 
become, often unknowingly, the source and the cause of 
our own infestation.
Second, pandemics are “declared.” As is the case with 
catastrophic events in history, like wars, famines, or mass 
cultural anomaly as bizarre as the Chinese Sorcery Scare 
of 1768, whose duration and identity result from an act of 
punctuation and sense-making entirely sociopolitical in 
nature, pandemics too begins with a performative act that 
announces their beginning and, having made them to 
begin in this way, determines when they reach their end, 
even though the viruses and their carriers may still be 
with(in) us (see Kuhn, 1992). Naming not microbial activ-
ities in nature but a crisis for humans, pandemics are 
events made real, public, and urgent, as just said, by a 
performative—a speech act, to be exact—whose authority 
in pronouncing their beginning and end depends on the 
very force that makes the declaration authoritative and 
forceful in the first place.
Brought into being by discourse and public communica-
tions, pandemics are social constructions; they signal a state 
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of emergency—appearing, first, as physical ailments on the 
part of individuals, subsequently identified and ratified by 
medical and scientific community as a real health problem, 
and finally materialized by authoritative broadcast and pub-
lic acknowledgment, thereupon becoming a public policy 
issue to be addressed by political leadership, all these over 
a determinate territory. Once established as such, a pan-
demic individualizes a collective paroxysm, making it a 
public enemy by giving it a face, a name, a certain life span 
in the social calendar, without which the havocs wreaked by 
the virus would not be the crisis its name designates and 
invokes. It is in this declarative nature of pandemics that we 
can see how viruses, once medicalized and publicly 
acknowledged, are inevitably entangled with science, his-
tory, culture, and politics. Socially constructed by a deci-
sion, by a cut or break into regular time, they mark a “zone 
of exception,” a temporal heterotopic, as it were, where we, 
individually and collectively, stand to one another as equal 
subjects to illness, unfreedom, and death in the unending 
drama of man against nature and its hostile elements.
Viruses are viruses are viruses. They have no political 
content; operating according to the laws of physics, chemis-
try, and biology, they come and go on their own rules and on 
their own times, as nature dictates. In sharp contrast, pan-
demics are biopolitical phenomena; they are moments of 
discontinuity or rupture in social order, shot through from 
start to finish with forces and factors that shape culture, his-
tory, and economy, which in turn determine what they mean 
and how they come about and come to pass. Moreover, and 
importantly, a pandemic is not a single, monolithic event; it 
is a series of localized epidemics, each with its own point of 
origin, its own history, its own epidemiological pattern and 
impacts. Further still, all these factors crisscross one another 
in a complex, nonlinear fashion, amassing multiple agents 
and stakeholders in such a critical fashion that the language 
of war is often used by the authority in charge to quell the 
infectious assault.9 Pandemics force social changes pre-
cisely because the changes they incur invite resistance. It is 
for this reason, perhaps for this reason alone, that pandem-
ics inevitably appear as a site of social contestations, politi-
cizing and politicized by the heterogeneous constructions 
barely betrayed by the name of a single virus.10 It is for this 
reason too that pandemics assert themselves as a sign of 
generalized cultural and economic strife, a symptom of 
social struggle underlying the health terror that a viral 
breakout unfailingly induces.
COVID-19 is a novel virus, novel in that scientists do 
not fully understand how it afflicts the body and therefore 
cannot predict its epidemiological paths. To control its 
spread, we have no choice but to employ methods devel-
oped from past experiences, such as quarantine/isolation, 
social distancing, face coverings, and contact tracing, to 
name a few now well-known. Because viruses are infec-
tious, to control its spread is, understandably, to separate 
and to isolate. This means that people be kept away from 
one another. Instead of gathering or being together, we 
make ourselves scare; better yet, we isolate ourselves, even 
if begrudgingly. More than that, the injunction of isolation 
leads straightaway to insulation in that the ultimate, fool-
proof means of isolation is to literally atomize ourselves, to 
turn ourselves into windowless monads. Indeed, all the mit-
igation measures we hear about of late—quarantine, mask 
wearing, hand washing, and social distancing—are in real-
ity anti-social measures. Don’t reach out and don’t touch 
anyone! Cover up your face! Just as social distancing—a 
contradiction in terms of sorts—means keeping physical 
distance, and just as mask wearing reduces mutual recogni-
tion based on simple vision to its unnatural minimum, 
(self-)isolation and quarantine all but eliminate human con-
tact of all kinds. When the plagues struck, we were all lep-
ers; when COVID-19 strikes, we are all windowless 
monads. Pandemics are born of communicable diseases, yet 
for this reason, they force us to be incommunicable. 
Flattening individuals and bringing to a halt exchange and 
commerce of every kind, they turn a society into one that is 
against society. If there is a history of pandemics, it is a his-
tory of anti-social history.
Neither alive nor dead, neither this nor that, viruses are 
by nature improper. Never proper, that is, never being (of) 
themselves, they appropriate—always ready to make others 
their own. They are pure media, as suggested earlier. Viruses 
are pure because they mediate unconditionally. However, 
inasmuch as unconditional mediation performed by viruses 
leads to the demise of their host, upon whom they depend 
for their parasitic reproduction, viruses end up annihilating 
themselves by their very nature; they are always already 
their own collateral casualties. Rendering themselves nil by 
simply being and subsisting as themselves, pure media are 
no (longer) media. Unconditional mediation ends all media-
tions. By bringing society to go against itself, viruses com-
mit suicide, so to speak, by killing their host, by the 
unconditional abuse of others’ hospitality. And, alas, we—
at least some of us—are spared.
Normal Returns?
COVID-19 is a new virus. But, unlike the known flu viruses, 
or H1N1, SARS, and the like, COVID-19 is considered 
“novel,” not the least because, as indicated earlier, it frus-
trates scientists’ understanding. “It has been like nothing 
else on Earth,” says an infectious-disease expert, who falls 
victim to the virus; “I knew I had the disease; it couldn’t 
have been anything else,” but “I don’t understand what’s 
happening in my body” (Yong, 2020). There are many 
things, inanimate or living, on Earth that are like nothing we 
know so far, and there are many things happing in our body 
that we do not understand at all. COVID-19 can justifiably 
be called “novel,” but isn’t every virus novel in its own way 
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and at some moment in time? Isn’t being novel the normal 
course of event in life and in life sciences as well? “There is 
novelty here,” remarks a prominent epidemiologist Karl 
Friston upon leaving a lab meeting about COVID-19, but he 
quickly adds, “so this, from my point of view, is just an 
average day” (Kosner, 2020). Being novel is the very char-
acteristic of all viruses and many other things in nature as 
well. The novelty of COVID-19 may not be as novel as we 
think.
What is possibly novel about COVID-19 is the fact that 
it gives us the first pandemic in our truly globalized age. 
The global village, in which we now live, is so hyper-con-
nected—not only by technology but also through affluence, 
commerce, and global travel—that an infectant can travel 
from one city to another as fast as jet streams flow. 
Connectivity translates qualitative diversity into measur-
able multiplicity, reducing distance and difference for the 
formation of the common, which in turn strengthens con-
nectivity. To be alive, as few would disagree, is to be con-
nected, literally and in every other sense. But this means 
that we must live in and with the risks that global connectiv-
ity brings to us. To be connected brings with it the possibil-
ity of being stranded in harm’s way. As COVID-19 makes 
clear, “connectivity is the killer” (Kosner, 2020). After all, 
life depends on maintaining boundaries and keeping differ-
ences. Deadly viruses are deadly because they breach them.
As infection rate rises, so does anxiety. And bleak scenes 
spread as wide as the virus goes. Deserted streets, boarded-
up stores, closed factories, shot-down public transporta-
tions; remote learning, work-from-home; stock markets 
crashed . . . and, worse yet, “I just lost my job.” Individual 
solation leads quickly to desolation across the board. And 
economy bears the brunt of a colossal coronal attack. 
Shortly after COVID-19 spread out of Wuhan, China, to 
Europe in January 2020, stories about the economic plight 
began to top the list of topics in public forums and news 
media. The future we face seems to lie in one of the two 
choices: to die from hunger or to die from the disease (餓死
或病死), as the expressions go in Chinese media. It is not 
for no reason that a policy brief released in June 2020 by the 
United Nations on the impact of the pandemic is given the 
title “The World of Work Cannot and Should Not Look the 
Same After This Crisis” (Guterres, 2020). The address on 
the launch of this brief, given by the Secretary-General 
António Guterres (2020), begins as follows:
The Covid-19 pandemic has turned the world of work upside 
down. Every worker, every business and every corner of the 
globe has been affected. Hundreds of millions of jobs have 
been lost . . . Many small and medium-sized enterprises—the 
engine of the global economy—may not survive.
After painting a depressing picture of the future and explain-
ing how difficult it will be for the world economy to return 
to “normal,” Guterres’s (2020) address makes a hardly per-
ceptible turn when he says “let’s not forgot the pre-Covid-19 
world was far from normal.” It seems then that, rather than 
shattering the world of work as we know it, the COVID-19 
pandemic simply exposes in higher resolution the “tremen-
dous shortcomings, fragilities and fault lines” that have 
been eroding society and economy from the bottom-up for 
decades. The pre-COVID-19 world, in which we thought 
we lived a normal life, is not as normal as we think (see 
Guterres, 2020).
To save the economy under siege is to “return to normal” 
as soon as possible, so cry the bureaucrats and journalists 
alike. But what is “normal” in this case? What does “being 
normal” mean exactly? Is the world, old or new, ever nor-
mal? There are norms regulating life, but has there ever 
been a “normal life” as such? The so-called normal life, a 
life before COVID-19, to which we pray to return, is in 
truth one of recollection, a romantic one at that, as the UN 
policy brief readily admits. Just as a viral infection may dis-
play more than one symptom on the part of its victims, 
embody more than one single illness, and create more than 
one single public health challenge, life, as it is actually 
lived, is hardly reducible to one normal life. In fact, the so-
called normal life is the one that brought us the pandemic in 
the first place. To live is to live normally; to return to nor-
mal is what living is all about. The so-called new normal is 
both new and not so new, which is to say, it is neither really 
new nor really normal. Perhaps the world has never been 
and will never be normal, whatever our idea of “being nor-
mal” means. If a pandemic can turn the world upside down, 
it is because life has been turning and turning again. And 
anything that returns cannot be entirely new.
Pandemics, quo vadis?
Humans have been haunted by viruses since time immemo-
rial. From the prehistoric pandemics in northeastern China 
5,000 years ago, uncovered at sites now called Hamin 
Mangha and Miaozigou, to the Justinian plague (541–549 
AD) that may have helped to bring down feudalism, or the 
small pox outbreak that finally toppled the Aztec empire 
before Hernán Cortés returned to the region in the spring of 
1521, viral infections have tormented the lands and their 
people over millennia. Traveling with host animals and 
humans, viruses had gone global long before globalization 
became a fact.
There are 10 known pandemics in the last 250 years, all 
displaying the same pattern of spiking in seasonal waves 
after the initial attacks. COVID-19, and some of its coronal 
cousins, will undoubtedly expand the list. To those who are 
living through its assault, the impacts brought about by 
COVID-19 are more or less clear and more or less measur-
able. But what is the meaning of COVID-19 when the cur-
rent pandemic is over? Will it be remembered? If so, in 
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what way and to what extent? If the history of pandemics 
has taught us anything, it is that history tends to repeat 
itself, that viral outbreaks are an ineliminable part of the 
natural history, in which humans are a part and in which no 
“zone of being” is free from viral infection. Recall the 
Spanish Flu of 1918, the worst pandemic during the last two 
centuries. It is estimated to have wiped out 50 million peo-
ple worldwide, meanwhile infecting 500 million, a third of 
the world’s population at the time. However, despite its 
short distance of mere one hundred years from us, few peo-
ple today know much about it, and still fewer are able to 
understand or feel the impact it had at that time. Its cente-
nary a short time ago passed noiselessly, certainly not for 
lack of stories or records. Like the many plagues before it, 
the Spanish Flu, it seems, never quite made itself into what 
Reinhart Koselleck (2018) calls the “the space of experi-
ence” (p. 34). Failing to make its way into collective mem-
ory, it is also helpless in figuring into our “horizon of 
expectation” (Koselleck, 2018, p. 14). If the Spanish Flu 
faded largely from memory, all the woes caused by COVID-
19 are, likewise, likely to dissipate in time, regardless of 
how we feel and say about it now. There was a pre-corona-
virus world, and there will be a post-coronavirus world, but 
viruses, known or novel, will outlast our worlds.
Viruses are everywhere and forever. So, plagues will 
never disappear for good (Camus, 1991, p. 307). But what 
then does it mean, the pandemic? It is life, that is all. A 
troubled memory, fading, under the vast indifference of the 
sky. Until the gate of Oran closes again.
Conclusion (Xuefeng Feng and  
Briankle G. Chang)
Assembled in this forum, the five short essays provide some 
modest reflections on the coronavirus pandemic and its still 
unfolding consequences. Committed to a variety of disci-
plinary perspectives and interests, the authors did not set 
out by pursuing any preset direction or common agenda 
supposedly carried out collectively in our intellectual labor. 
Rather, what unifies the diverse inquiries in these essays is 
the shared awareness about the confusion in the public dis-
course that constantly fails to distinguish a coronavirus 
called COVID-19 from the COVID-19 pandemic, or as 
Briankle reminds us in his essay, from “a series of localized 
epidemics.” This alertness constitutes a common ground in 
addressing specific issues or phenomena in these essays.
This forum is anything but comprehensive. If it can con-
tribute to the discussion of the crisis, it is most likely 
because all the essays refuse to bind the pandemic exclu-
sively with the coronavirus and to position the virus and 
humanity in rigid opposition to each other. In her multispe-
cies ethnography, Anna Tsing tells a marvelous story about 
matsutake mushrooms. “When Hiroshima was destroyed by 
an atomic bomb in 1945,” says she, “it is said, the first 
living thing to emerge from the blasted landscape was a 
matsutake mushroom” (Tsing, 2015, p. 3). When human 
history temporarily comes to a halt in disasters, matsutake, 
and also viruses in our case, may well survive and continue 
to thrive with their own stories. Histories are being made 
every day by humans and non-humans alike; however, the 
future for those histories to converge has still yet to come. 
As demonstrated in the essays gathered here, while govern-
ments and the public are desperate to frame the virus in their 
own social and political narratives, the virus also works 
hard to inscribe its historicity on the earth and humans too.
If a message must be dispatched out to all at this juncture, 
it is that for a future of collaborative survival, the stake of 
living together has nothing to do with harmony and conquest, 
but is derived from “disturbance-based ecologies” (Tsing, 
2015, p. 5), that is, plagues. Plagues are life, that is all.
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Notes
 1. In a trilogy of contemporary essays, Baudrillard (1995) 
argued that the war in the desert was a new phenomenon, 
because it was defined and shaped by its discursive aspect as 
a form of television programming, regardless of what hap-
pened on the ground.
 2. That earlier announcement called “demonetisation” led to 
a vast contraction of commerce and an immiseration of a 
majority of the population which has still not recovered, and 
is now widely considered an unnecessary exercise of per-
sonal whimsy. For an analysis of the economic consequences, 
see Ghosh et al. (2017).
 3. The decline of Indian agriculture is not adequately discussed 
in the celebration of urban growth. Its effects are however 
inescapable and directly lead to the growth of informal set-
tlements in cities (Balakrishnan, 2020; Jaffrelot & Thakker, 
2020).
 4. Mediatization, or the analysis of events with their mediated 
construction as the starting point, is a phenomenon that has 
grown in importance across cultural contexts, as media theo-
rists attempt to understand the increasing influence of media 
forms on culture, especially with the virtualization of human 
interaction and the redefinition of community through the use 
of social media and mobile communication. For a fuller dis-
cussion, see Couldry and Hepp (2013).
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 5. Re-examining her arguments in Citizenship and Its 
Discontents: An Indian History (2013), Jayal (2019) traces 
the current shift in the discourse of Indian citizenship from 
an egalitarian rights-based model to a new regime predicated 
on religious and cultural identity, given shape through the 
concomitant technocratic frames of transactional welfare and 
biometric identity.
 6. Four short essays provide further context and narrate the 
response: Shankar et al. (2020).
 7. Partha Chatterjee’s (2004, 2011) insightful categorization of 
Indian society separates the distinct ontological domain of a 
small formal “civil society” that includes rights-bearing citi-
zens, from the vast undifferentiated mass of the population 
that constitutes “political society” and which forms the actual 
locus of democratic practice.
 8. The current Indian government has dramatically increased 
the acquisition and use of big data in governance, including 
a reliance on biometric identification for access to welfare 
programs and the use of mobile phones for access to services: 
Part of the government’s COVID-19 response was in the 
form of a mandatory mobile application that purported to use 
location tracking to show active virus infections in the user’s 
vicinity. An analysis of its invasive nature can be found in a 
working paper by Deb (2020).
 9. Societies always declared war on problems they cannot 
solve: war on drugs, war on poverty, and the like. It is no 
surprise to see Donald Trump refers to COVID-19 as an 
“invisible enemy” and calls himself a war-time president in 
his speeches on the COVID-19 pandemic. Similar examples 
abound across the board throughout history. It is widely rec-
ognized by epidemiologists today that the model developed 
by John Snow based on the cholera outbreaks between 1831 
and 1853 in England is too linear to be of any use in con-
temporary pandemics. Like the global climate instability or 
financial market volatility, pandemics are nonlinear phe-
nomena, displaying a high degree of uncertainty that defies 
simple causal explanation. On this, see Kosner (2020).
10. It is therefore not surprising that we observe Donald Trump 
repeatedly refers to COVID-19 as Wuhan virus or Kung Flu 
in reaction to his rise and fall in poll and public opinion as he 
tries to find scapegoat, in this case, China, for his sorry fail-
ure in handling the crisis. A virus is always more than a virus 
when it enters the body politic.
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